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§8.85

The Davis “Emergency Exception”

Two years after Crawford, the Court revisited the Confrontation Clause in the Davis case, which
was a consolidated review of domestic abuse convictions in Washington and Indiana. The
Washington case involved the use of a woman’s 911 call reporting abuse by her boyfriend, and
the Indiana case involved the use of a wife’s statements to officers summoned to the scene by a
911 call, in which she described her husband’s assaultive behavior. In both cases, the statements
fit the excited utterance exception, and the complaining witness did not testify. Adopting a
“primary purpose” test, the Court concluded in the Washington case that the statement was
nontestimonial. The reason was that the operator’s primary purpose in questioning the caller was
to enable a police response to “an ongoing emergency.” In the Indiana case, however, the Court
concluded that the statement was testimonial because the primary purpose in questioning the wife
after the assault was to determine “what happened” and “investigate a possible crime,” not to
determine what was happening at the time. 1 The Court held that statements are “nontestimonial
when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency.”
As it emerged in Davis, the emergency exception was narrowly crafted: With police on the scene
in the Indiana case, and the abuser and victim physically separated, the emergency was over,
although clearly hostilities might continue that police intervention did not solve. Perhaps the Court
anticipated that ongoing assistance would address these risks: The man was arrested and charged,
and commonly in such situations police or prosecutors obtain court orders requiring the abuser not
to approach the woman as a condition of release from custody. The woman too could probably get
assistance. The implicit message is that the emergency exception applies for as long as there is
immediate risk of harm, coupled with a need to gather information in order to prevent or mitigate
harm. 2
The Court in Davis rejected a broad argument that only “initial inquiries” are nontestimonial.
At the same time, the Court noted that a conversation that begins as an interrogation to determine
the need for emergency assistance can “evolve into testimonial statements” once that purpose has
been achieved. The line is between accounts describing the present situation in which danger must
be assessed, as in the Washington case, and accounts describing what had happened in the past to
bring the danger into being, as in the Indiana case. Thus initial contacts with police may be
nontestimonial, while later statements may be testimonial, when the focus has shifted from
§8.85 1. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
2. State v. Boggs, 185 P.3d 111 (Ariz. 2008) (statements by employee of fast food restaurant, after being shot and
while dying on ground at rear of restaurant, seeking help and saying bad people might still be there, fit emergency
doctrine); United States v. Arnold, 486 F.2d 177, 189-192 (6th Cir. 2007) (911 call by G, threatened by gun carried
by convicted murderer A who was G’s mother’s boyfriend, fit emergency doctrine; G sought “protection” from
ongoing emergency because A “remained at large” and was “fixing to shoot her,” and fact that G went to car around
corner before calling “did not make the emergency less real or less pressing,” as G “had no reason to know” whether
A had stayed in residence or followed her).

assessing present danger and taking steps to end it, and focuses instead on investigating crime. 3
Bryant case
Determining when an emergency has ended and when statements to authorities become
testimonial remains a continuing challenge. In the Bryant case, 4 the Court significantly broadened
the scope of this inquiry. In Bryant, police found the victim Covington in a gas station parking lot
at 3:25 A.M. dying of a gunshot wound to the abdomen. Police asked “what had happened, who
had shot him, and where the shooting occurred.” Covington answered that “Rick” Bryant had shot
him at about 3 A.M., that he had a conversation with him through the back door of Bryant’s house,
and that as he turned to leave he was shot through the door. The conversation lasted five to ten
minutes before paramedics arrived, and they transported Covington to a hospital where he died
within hours. Police went to Bryant’s house, found blood and a bullet on the back porch and an
apparent bullet hole in the door, and also found Covington’s wallet and identification. Bryant,
however, had fled the scene and was arrested a year later in California and charged with the
murder. The prosecutor introduced Covington’s statements as “excited utterances,” and Bryant
was convicted. However, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding that Covington’s
statements to the police were testimonial and did not fit the Davis emergency doctrine. (The
prosecutor had not pursued the dying declaration exception, and the Michigan Supreme Court held
that the question whether Bryant’s statements fit that exception was not before it.). The U.S.
Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court, holding that there was an
ongoing emergency and therefore Covington’s statements were nontestimonial hearsay.
The Court gave several reasons for finding an ongoing emergency at the time Covington made
his statements. First, Covington said nothing to the police indicating that the cause of the shooting
“was a purely private dispute” or that “the threat from the shooter had ended.” The assailant may
have posed a potential threat to the police and the public. Second, the case involved a gun, and the
assailant was still at large. Here an armed shooter, whose “motive for” and “location after the
shooting” were unknown, had mortally wounded someone at a location “within a few blocks and
a few minutes” of the location where police found the victim. Third, Covington’s answers to the
officer’s questions “were punctuated with questions about when emergency medical services
would arrive.” He was in considerable pain and had difficulty talking. Under these circumstances,
the Court could not say that a person in Covington’s situation would have had a “primary purpose”
to make statements to establish past events relevant to a criminal prosecution. Fourth, the questions
asked by the police about what had happened were the “exact type of questions” necessary to allow
the police to “assess the situation,” including the threat to their own safety as well as possible
continuing danger to the victim and to the public. Fifth, these were only “initial” inquiries, which
often produce nontestimonial statements, in contrast to the more detailed interrogation in
Crawford. Finally, the Court noted the informality of the circumstances of the interrogation, with
the victim lying bleeding in a gas station parking lot in the early hours of the morning. There was
3. State v. Shea, 965 A.2d 504 (Vt. 2008) (initial statements by victim of domestic battery fit emergency exception;
these described assault and identified perpetrator; later questioning of the victim elicited statements that were
testimonial).
4. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011).

no structured, stationhouse interview as there had been in Crawford.
The Bryant opinion made several points that are important in determining the scope of the
emergency exception in future cases. The Court addressed the confusion arising from Davis about
whether to focus on one participant in questioning rather than another by saying that a combined
approach is required that focuses on “the statements and actions of both the declarant and
interrogators” in determining the primary purpose of the interrogation. In dissent, Justice Scalia
vigorously disagreed, saying that “[t]he declarant’s intent is what counts.” The Court indicated
that the “primary purpose” inquiry is objective and focuses on the purpose that reasonable
participants would have had, not on the subjective intent of the particular parties. The inquiry is
highly context-dependent and invites consideration of “standard rules of hearsay” that treat some
statements as “reliable.” Finally, the Court commented that “there may be other circumstances,
aside from ongoing emergencies,” where statements are not procured for the “primary purpose” of
criminal investigation or prosecution, and cited as examples some common hearsay exceptions
such as business records and public records.
Clark case
In 2015, the Court again took up the emergency doctrine, this time in the setting of child abuse.
In its decision in the Clark case, the Court approved the use in evidence of statements by threeyear-old LP to his preschool teacher identifying his mother’s live-in boyfriend “Dee Dee” as the
source of injuries that the teacher had noticed (bloodshot eyes, red marks “like whips,” and further
injuries on the child’s torso). LP’s statements, the Court held in Clark, were uttered in the context
of “an ongoing emergency involving suspected child abuse,” and LP’s teachers “needed to know
whether it was safe to release LP to his guardian at the end of the day” and to figure out “who
might be abusing the child,” so their immediate concern was “to protect a vulnerable child who
needed help,” and there was “no indication that the primary purpose of the conversation was to
gather evidence.” 5

5. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2182-2183 (2015) (majority opinion by Justice Alito; Justices Scalia and Ginsburg
concur in judgment).

